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RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments
RFID has emerged as something truly new that implicates many of our long-standing 
concerns and adds new ones to the mix-privacy, contracting, data security, international 
differences, government-driven development, regulation, and legislative policy-setting 
are all critical to discuss when it comes to this technology, plus we need to delineate 
how lawyers might understand and explain the technology and its applications to 
others.  This book makes enormous strides in all those directions.
—from Michael Fleming’s Foreword
Recently, physical objects other than computers are being identiﬁed in the Internet 
using RFID technology. The information emanating from an RFID tag can be used to 
identify and authenticate information about a physical object, but such information 
also can be useful input to related information resources. The term “Internet of Things” 
(IoT) has emerged to describe the interoperability between information associated 
with physical objects and other information systems.
—from “The Handle System and its Application to RFID and the 
Internetof Things” by Patrice A. Lyons and Robert E. Kahn
The “ﬁnal frontier” of RFID in the workplace is the actual implantation of RFID chips 
under the skin of certain employees, for continual tracking purposes. While this would 
be out of the question for cubicle employees, it would be more plausible for employees 
working in mine shafts, ﬁreﬁghters, and even military personnel who may potentially 
beneﬁt from the tracking capability.
—from “RFID in Canada” by Lisa R. Lifshitz and Daniel Sterescu
Retailers in the apparel industry have employed RFID in warehouses to streamline 
the supply chain and introduce transparency with regard to information pertaining to 
the products tagged. Such a system witnesses less human intervention and provides 
cost efﬁciency and data accuracy.
—from “RFID in India” by Sajai Singh
RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments
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C H A P T E R 19 
  
An Economic Survey Analysis of 
the Legal Literature Pertaining to 
the Privacy Implications of Radio 
Frequency Identification Technology 
Mike Jerbic* 
I. Introduction 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is general technology 
increasing in use globally for the identification and tracking of people, 
animals, and things. Over the past decade, legal scholars and practitioners 
have published a substantial body of literature that discusses how use of 
the technology could threaten individual consumer privacy interests. In 
response to this literature and other events, former California Governor 
*Mike Jerbic, an electrical engineer, economist, and a long-time member of the Cyberspace 
Law Committee, is principal consultant at Trusted Systems Consulting Group, a lecturer in 
Economics at San Jose State University, and a member of the Board of Directors of Cali­
fornia Hydronics Corporation. Professor Jerbic is a past chair of The Open Group Security 
Forum and formerly worked at Hewlett Packard. His other publications include Mike Jerbic 
and Stephen S. Wu, The Security Rule, in A GUIDE TO HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW (ABA, 
2007); Mike Jerbic et al., Information Security Strategy: A Framework for Information-Centric 
Governance (The Open Group Security Forum, 2007), www.opengroup.org (document W075); 
and Mattias Hallendorff and Mike Jerbic, Framework for Control over Electronic Chattel 
Paper— Compliance with UCC §9-105, 61 BUS. LAW.  721 (Feb. 2006). 
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480 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill 31 on September 30, 2008.1 This 
law outlaws the skimming of personal information from RFID tags embed­
ded in identity documents, such as passports, without the data subject’s 
knowledge or consent. It provides for imprisonment for up to one year, a 
fine of not more than $1,500, or both.2 
Although the legal literature focuses on privacy rights and law theory, 
intellectual property theory, and other matters related to law, it occasion­
ally also analyzes involved actors’ economic interests to justify government 
intervention (or nonintervention) in the use of RFID technology. This 
essay surveys the legal literature from about 2004 through 2008 and looks 
at the economic arguments made and risks identified in various legislative 
proposals and recommendations related to the private sector use of RFID 
technology. The essay concentrates its analysis in these dimensions: 
r Market (private) interests, power, and failure 
r Privacy risk analysis broken down into expected value of loss and 
possible or speculative value of loss 
r Alternatives to state coercion in managing privacy concerns: private 
sector norms, architectures, and markets 
r Suggestions for future work that provides the highest return for a 
marginal research investment 
This essay is written for those who have an interest in affecting public pol­
icy around this issue. Although the policy-making process may not require 
economic analysis, legislators and advocates of any position would improve 
their argumentative position through consideration of the economic impli­
cations of their proposals and positions. Incentives matter and modifying 
the law changes incentives for all affected parties. 
II. How the Economics of Private Information are 
Different from Ideas and Knowledge Generally 
Thomas Jefferson commented on the possession and use of information: 
1.  S.B. 31, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
2.  S.B. 31, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
BL_CSTF_RFID_FINAL.indd   481 7/8/13   3:43 PM
  
            
 
           
           
            
         
          
           
          
        
           
 
        
      
 
       
 
 
      
   
     
  
     
 
Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 481 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, 
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to 
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the posses­
sion of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. 
Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because 
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from 
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who 
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That 
ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for 
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his 
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed 
by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, 
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which 
we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confine­
ment or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, 
be a subject of property.3 
Economists describe information of all kinds such as ideas, knowledge, 
and records, as nonrival, nonexcludable goods which, after initial produc­
tion, maximizes social welfare when used and reused as much as possible 
to produce marketable goods and services. Economists model information 
production as having a fixed cost to produce but no additional, incremental 
costs on each subsequent reuse. Guided by Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,”4 
profit seekers aggregating, transforming, and repurposing information for 
private gain not only make themselves better off, but make all of us better 
off  as well. 
Reusing, aggregating, transforming, and repurposing personal and 
“private” information, however, can place costs upon the subject of that 
3.	  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 333-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905), 
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. 
4.	 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, at 363-64 
(1776), available at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/Wealth-Nations. 
pdf. 
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482 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
information who subsequently may bear embarrassment, loss of reputa­
tion, intrusion into his or her personal space, criminal misuse, and other 
consequences. Incrementally using private information without internaliz­
ing these costs incentivizes profit seekers to overuse and over-reuse private 
information for private gain at the expense of an overall reduction in total 
welfare. This is the economic problem, or market failure, that government 
intervention through privacy policy, law, and regulation tries to solve. The 
severity of the real empirical problem and the effectiveness of the solutions 
to that problem are other matters. Regulatory solutions are tradeoffs that 
not only have the anticipated benefits, but costs as well. 
III. How Contactless Data Exchange May Affect 
Privacy Differently than Other Identification 
Technologies 
Regulating the use of private information is common around the globe. What 
makes contactless data exchange something new to regulate or otherwise 
control? What is specific to this technology that worries privacy advocates 
and policymakers over and above other forms of collecting sensitive private 
information? Briefly, contactless data exchange technology as expressed 
through the example of radio frequency identification (RFID) has these 
features and consequences not previously seen. 
A. The kind of data available. 
RFID tags can contain anything. When embedded in an ID card, they can 
contain any manner of personal information. When attached to a product, 
they can identify product manufacturer, product number, and serial number 
for an unlimited number of products. In other words, RFID tags have the 
potential to uniquely identify every person and thing on the Earth. In the 
supply chain, they have been called “barcodes on steroids.”5 
5.	 The Honorable Patrick Leahy, United States Senate, The Dawn of Micro Monitoring: 
Its Promise, and its Challenges to Privacy and Security, Address Before the Conference 
on Video Surveillance: Legal And Technological Challenges, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. 
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Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 483 
B. Data collection at a distance and without consent of the 
consumer. 
RFID tags contain information that a radio transmitter/receiver “reader”
can read and harvest at a distance ranging from a few inches to about 30 
feet, without the knowledge or consent of the data subject. Using radio, 
the “reader” does not even need a line of sight to read the “tag.” Deriving 
their power from the radio frequency transmissions from the reader, high-
volume, low-cost RFID tags also operate free from local power sources. 
Without emitting any constant signal, which might alert the consumer, and 
without any power source to wear out, these tags can operate indefinitely 
and without any consumer awareness. 
Although RFID tags considered in this analysis are the inexpensive “read 
only” and “passive” variety, they can contain a block of any information the 
tag producer wishes to encode. This might include personally identifiable 
individual, access, and authorization information for ID card use; product 
identification information for anticounterfeiting; inventory tracking that 
management integrated into products or their packaging; and health record 
information encoded into chips implanted into patients. The tag’s producer 
knows what’s on the tag. Consumers do not, making them unaware of what 
information is being collected about them. 
Because the tags can be small, about the size of a grain of rice, consum­
ers may be ignorant of their presence and use in products. Clothing may 
have an RFID tag nearly invisibly integrated into a label or piece of fabric, 
for example. A consumer wearing a tagged article of clothing and carrying 
an RFID identification card or passport could, after an initial scan with 
both the clothing and passport, be later identified solely by identifying the 
clothing article alone, raising an issue of whether scanning her clothing 
violates her privacy rights. 
(Mar. 23, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2004/s032304.html. Senator 
Leahy appears to have coined the phrase “barcodes on steroids.” 
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484 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
C. Data aggregation to build profiles. 
Data collected from RFIDs can be aggregated to build consumer profiles, 
again without the consumer’s knowledge. Privacy advocates worry that tags 
identifying products can be read in conjunction with consumer ID informa­
tion to build profiles of that consumer, which could reveal that Consumer 
X buys brand Y, reads books Z, associates with other consumers A, B, and 
C, etc. Profiles built would have a market value to both private and public 
organizations. 
D. Data repurposing, reuse, and resale 
As data are aggregated and profiles built, even if consumers consent to an 
initial use of information, data can be used for purposes not conceived at 
the time of consent. In addition, profiles compiled from data collected may 
be valuable for new purposes, and profile holders may sell profiles or other 
aggregated information to willing buyers, including public-sector buyers. 
Although data reuse and resale is nothing new, RFID technology may reduce 
the cost of individual data collection and aggregation, and may improve the 
specificity and quality of the data to the point where new privacy threats 
emerge that previously were economically unfeasible. 
“Contactless data exchange,” or “RFID,” is not one but a collection of 
information devices that spans a spectrum of low-cost, low-function devices 
to high-cost, high-function devices and systems. The low-cost, rice-size, 
passive RFID chips represent the high-volume, low-cost part of the mar­
ket. Beyond its uses for inventory management, this technology has been 
integrated into credit and debit cards, employee identification cards, auto­
mobile keys, and other applications where a low-cost, contactless electronic 
identifier improves productivity, performance, and security. 
At the high-cost, high-function end of the spectrum, services such as 
GM’s OnStar—a tracking and emergency response system—and the Fas-
Trak highway and bridge toll transponder also are within the scope of 
“contactless data exchange technology.” All these technologies share the 
potential that data may be collected without the data subject’s knowledge 
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Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 485 
or permission, aggregated to build profiles, and subsequently repurposed, 
reused, or resold. 
Just as in any other differentiated-product market, competition in contact-
less information exchange markets likely will produce products at various 
cost and value price points. Although the literature emphasized privacy 
threats from the lowest-cost, highest-volume RFID tag technology, only 
time will tell which technical price-information source may or may not turn 
out to be the most privacy-relevant one. 
As a new technology ripening for commercial and government use and 
abuse, contactless data exchange appears to threaten individual privacy as 
traditionally appreciated and expected. The question surveyed now, and the 
subject for the rest of this essay, is “how has the literature assessed these 
threats as a matter of economic theory and incentive?” 
IV. Private Market Forces, Power, and Failure 
Underlying any market force theory is the notion that property rights in 
information are well defined and exchangeable. Lars Smith asks that very 
question in his paper, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns 
the Data?, and the answer is far from obvious.6 A consumer’s property rights 
in information about himself or its aggregation are unclear. Does the origi­
nator or collector of the information have ultimate control over who can 
read it as copyright law might imply? Might the reader owner(s) “own” the 
harvested data more than the entity that originally installed or placed the 
RFID tag into the object? Does the possessor of the device on which the 
information is stored own it as tangible property law might imply? Some­
how is it a combination of both? Neither? What law dominates? Market 
exchanges of information rights leading to privacy rights depends on solv­
ing this problem. 
One thing is certain, however. A consumer’s right to control information 
about himself is not absolute, but one that depends on the situation. No 
one has a right to privacy to control incriminating evidence about himself 
6.	 Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns the Data?, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695 (2006). 
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486 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
when, for example, law enforcement has a warrant to search for that evi­
dence. Consumers generally have no rights to keep their actions private when 
conducted in a public place. Therefore, privacy is a question not of whether 
there’s some protection, but how much and under what circumstances. 
In spite of confusion over the definition and initial assignment of rights, 
the surveyed literature separated into two general categories of its inter­
pretation of markets and market forces: (1) free market forces dominate 
and sustain efficient privacy, and (2) market failure forces dominate and 
prevent efficient privacy. 
A. Free market forces dominate and sustain privacy 
Consumers negotiate preferred levels of privacy with business, achieving an 
economically efficient and mutually agreeable level of well-being based on 
market opportunity, incentives, and equilibriums. Commentators including 
Brito7 and Ulatowski8 show how RFID applications can be created, tried 
out, and, if found sufficiently objectionable to consumers, die out without 
any government intervention.9 Using the Nike and iPod Sport Kit as an 
example, Ulatowski discusses the commercial viability of a hypothetical 
RFID reader network that scans information from iPod Sport Kit cus­
tomers passing by the readers during their routine exercise and concludes: 
Beyond simple hackers, this technology might be attractive to the 
corporate world. In fact, it would be quite easy, and possibly quite 
lucrative, “for a company to build their own tiny readers and deploy 
them in a large environment, selling the data stream to those who 
would track spouses or teens, or collect information about how many 
people wearing Nikes visit malls or movie theaters.” Retailers are not 
likely to employ this technology, however, because they have little 
7.	 Jerry Brito, Relax, Don’t Do It: Why RFID Privacy Concerns Are Exaggerated and Legis­
lation Is Premature, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 5 (2004). 
8.	  Laura M. Ulatowski, Privacy on the Internet and in Organizational Database: Recent Devel­
opments in RFID Technology: Weighing Utility Against Potential Privacy Concerns, 3 ISJLP 
623 (2008). 
9.	 See Brito, supra note 7; Ulatowski, supra note 8. 
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Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 487 
motivation to invade customers’ privacy. The public backlash would 
probably be reason enough to dissuade retailers from employing such 
technology.10 
Proponents of the “free market forces dominate” theory suggest govern­
ment regulatory restraint, and if any intervention is needed, government 
should implement it only after the public need has been firmly established. 
Brito, in particular, writes: “Before we regulate, we should first confirm 
that privacy fears are not baseless and will not be constrained by market 
forces. Additionally, we should be more concerned by government use of 
RFID—something to which privacy advocates have paid little attention.”11 
B. Market failure forces dominate and prevent privacy 
This theory posits that some businesses will have sufficient market power 
to coerce consumers into exchanging their personal information or allow­
ing information to be collected about them involuntarily. Alternatively, 
consumers unwilling to share their information will “be forced” to pay for 
that choice through higher retail prices. This theory rests on an assumption 
that major retailers have pricing power and will use it to gather, aggregate, 
and exploit personal information for private business use at the expense of 
the efficient public good privacy level. Eden12 and Stein13 share this general 
view. Eden, in particular, writes: 
There are two broad threats to privacy posed by this new technology. 
First, under our current privacy regime private companies are at liberty 
to gather, process, and share customer data without obtaining customer 
consent to specific data aggregation, archival, and sharing policies and 
procedures. This feature of our privacy regime is particularly vexing 
10.	  Ulatowski, supra note 8, at 635. 
11.	  Brito, supra note 7, at 5. 
12.	 John M. Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy Act of
1974, and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20 (2005). 
13.	 Serena G. Stein, Where Will Consumers Find Privacy Protection from RFID?: A Case for 
Federal Legislation, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3 (2007). 
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488 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
given that we live in an era in which identity theft is particularly com­
mon and extremely hard to prevent; thus control over private data 
is extremely important. Second, the absence of meaningful regula­
tion of new surveillance technologies, particularly RFID, is having 
a profound effect on the broader social norms that privacy protects. 
Private facts about consumer preference patterns are currently treated 
as cost-free commodities for corporate America: companies need not 
pay for the privilege of aggregating and using data, nor is consumer 
consent regarded as necessary because consumer surveillance has 
already been presented as a common practice that is usually in con­
sumers’ best interests.14 
In light of dominant market failures leading to inefficiently low public 
privacy expectations, proponents of this theory advocate preemptive gov­
ernment intervention to prevent privacy abuses and erosion of public 
expectations. 
Two groups emerge from this analysis. On the one hand, those who believe 
that private markets will determine an efficient balance of the social good 
of privacy, private economic growth, and welfare will have a hands-off, 
wait-and-see approach to regulation or other governmental intervention. 
On the other hand, those who foresee an as-yet-undemonstrated market 
failure demand immediate preventive government intervention. 
V. Privacy Risks: Probable Loss Versus 
Possible Loss 
RFID technology is new and its applications now and into the future are 
uncertain. Originally intended as a tool to reduce private sector losses in 
global supply chains and to improve security through “smart” identification 
cards, RFID no doubt will find new, innovative uses that have unintended 
consequences of both its planned and unplanned use. All new technologies 
have this fate and RFID is no different. 
14.  Eden, supra note 12 at 21. 







             
 
         
 
 
        
           
    
           
        
        
  
   
   
    
  
   
Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 489 
Although the privacy literature is clear that there is no absolute right to 
privacy, an expectation of privacy is a social good that makes us all better 
off. A measure of privacy protects civil society; a bit more protects indi­
viduals from identity theft or misuse of information. 
Government specifically protects the privacy of certain personal infor­
mation such as health records through HIPAA15 and financial information 
through the privacy provisions of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.16 
Expectations of privacy exist in attorney-client privilege, and privately con­
tracted confidentiality clauses are enforceable to enable commerce. The 
question is not whether we should have privacy, but rather how much and under 
what circumstances. Risks to privacy, as measured by the expected value of 
its loss, represent real social costs. 
In analyzing privacy risks, the literature takes generally two approaches: 
(1) a probable approach to the loss of privacy and (2) a speculative, worst-
case scenario, possible-loss approach. Although the probable-value approach 
is true risk management17 in the economic and classical sense, the other, 
speculative approach is not. Policymakers reviewing the literature need to 
determine which discussion of risk is used and use the literature accordingly. 
This section describes the two approaches and gives an example to help out. 
A. Probable privacy loss 
Brito discusses likely RFID technology capability, especially at price lev­
els that would enable pervasive use, concluding that in the private sector 
retailers already track consumer purchases, with consent through loyalty 
programs and otherwise, and attempts to track individuals’ movements 
and locations through movement of their purchased goods is unreliable.18 
15.	  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936. 
16.	  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 
113 Stat. 1339. 
17.	 See Open Group Risk Taxonomy Standard, Open Group document C081, 18-19 available 
at www.opengroup.org/bookstore/catalog/c081.htm (discussing the components of infor­
mation risk). 
18.	 See Brito, supra note 7 at 18, 21–23. 
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490 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
Although the private sector possibly could invade consumer privacy with 
RFID technology, Brito argues that the profit motive checks and incentives 
make invasion unlikely.19 The probable privacy loss in his analysis is far less 
than the possible loss discussed in other literature. 
Ulatowski looks at privacy as a continuum, not as an absolute, and forms 
estimates of privacy risks within a cost-benefit framework and an evalua­
tion of the likely threats. Ulatowski concludes: 
With RFID technology, “[t]he cost of the sacrifice of privacy is hard 
to quantify while the touted benefits seem hard for many people to 
overvalue.” Maybe the government and private industry are right to 
tout the exceptional benefits to efficiency, privacy and security. Per­
haps the threat to personal privacy is not as great as some privacy 
advocates fear. The most significant limitation to RFIDs’ tracking 
capabilities is that the power level of the chip must be quite low so as 
not to interfere with other devices using radio frequency. 
One real privacy threat comes not from RFID devices themselves, 
but from hackers. In fact, hacking seems to be getting easier by the 
day. Plus, mobile phone vendors are looking into developing portable 
RFID readers coupled with cellular phones, making “RFID technol­
ogy a user-driven activity in addition to one controlled by companies.”
If any teenage hacker with a cell phone can access personal informa­
tion held on an RFID, it makes for quite an alarming proposition.20 
B. Possible privacy loss 
Eden, J. Smith, and Stein speculate on possible outcomes that are unproven 
and ignore the likelihood or probability of the event.21 Eden’s abstract puts 
it succinctly: 
19.	 See Brito, supra note 7 at 37. 
20.	  Ulatowski, supra note 7 at 647–48 (footnotes omitted). 
21.	 See Eden, supra note 12 at 11–14; Jennifer E. Smith, Recent Development: You Can Run, 
but You Can’t Hide: Protecting Privacy from Radio Frequency Identification Technology, 8 
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 249, 262-265 (2007); Stein, supra note 13 at 6–7. 
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Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 491 
RFID is a powerful new technology that has the potential to allow 
commercial retailers to undermine individual control over private 
information. . . . Although some potential privacy abuses could be 
addressed by modifying RFID technology, this iBrief argues that it 
would be wise to amend the Privacy Act of 1974 so that corporations 
would have a statutory obligation to preserve individual anonymity 
and respect the privacy preferences of consumers.22 
In addition, Stein concludes that “[i]n the absence of enforceable regula­
tions, society risks being subjected to an unprecedented level of Orwellian 
surveillance”23 and J. Smith foresees that “[w]ithout regulation, RFID will 
be used to track both products and people.”24 
Because they’re uncertain, technology’s capabilities are often exaggerated, 
especially with respect to features not yet available at a mass consumption 
prices—or expected to be available in those price ranges in the near future. 
Speculative privacy loss not only depends on a general market failure theory, 
where consumers involuntarily hand over access to personal information, but 
also upon a widely deployed and available technical infrastructure to gather, 
process, transform, and exploit that information. These assumptions of 
market failure and an enabling and cost-effective ubiquitous infrastructure 
are common to analyses recommending preemptive governmental interven­
tion to prevent unspecified yet dire outcomes. Politicians have amplified this 
approach: “[T]he RFID train is beginning to leave the station, and now is 
the right time to begin a national discussion about where, if at all, any lines 
will be drawn to protect privacy rights.”25 
Policymakers motivated by the public interest should evaluate carefully 
what social risks they are attempting to manage, the likelihood of the benefits 
22.	  Eden, supra note 12 at 1. 
23.	  Stein, supra note 13 at 3. 
24.	  Smith, supra note 21 at 250. 
25.	  Katherine Albrecht and Liz McIntyre, RFID: The Big Brother Bar Code, 6 ALEC POL’Y
FORUM 49 (Winter 2004) (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy at the panel discussion on Video 
Surveillance: Legal and Technological Challenges at Georgetown University Law Center 
(Mar. 23, 2004)), available at http://www.spychips.com/alec-big-brother-barcode-article. 
html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
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492 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
exceeding the cost of managing those risks, and the residual risk remaining 
in considering any law or regulation. When using the literature on RFID, 
including the essays in this ABA collection, policymakers should internalize 
the authors’ perspectives on privacy, distinguish between likely and specula­
tive risks, and assess the cost effectiveness of any proposed rule, regulation, 
or other policy intervention. In other words, the policymaker’s perspective 
on privacy is key: is privacy an absolute, all-or-nothing proposition, or is 
it a continuum to be traded off  against other competing social objectives? 
VI. Alternatives to Law and Regulation 
Although the vast majority of the literature concentrates on RFID technol­
ogy, the probable and possible outcomes of its use, and the recommendations 
for its regulation, a minority strand presents alternatives to law and regula­
tion to achieve the desired social outcome. In particular, Ronzani, citing the 
work of Larry Lessig as a backdrop and Lessig’s four “modalities” of law, 
social norms, markets, and technical architecture, stresses the need to look 
beyond law to constrain behavior.26 Social norms include not only unwrit­
ten rules within a community to govern or moderate behavior, but also 
voluntarily agreed to and enforceable codes of practice and standards of 
business conduct developed through private business associations. Markets, 
as already discussed in the literature, moderate behavior through voluntary 
exchange and prices, but the role of technical architecture—that is, techni­
cal features that constrain behavior or capability such as privacy-enhancing 
technology—is generally new to the discussion of RFID social policy. Ron­
zani discusses the problem as: 
The problem is that from a holistic perspective, we risk over-regulating 
with law if we do not consider the trade-off between the four modali­
ties. As noted earlier, the claim in this paper is that if norms, market 
and architecture are considered, this will result in less need for laws. 
26.	  Daniel Ronzani, Modality Mix of RFID Regulation, 3 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 222 (2008) 
(referencing Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999)). 
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Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 493 
This trade-off is possible and affordable because the technology-inde­
pendent legislation enacted at [sic] European level is already sufficient 
to protect the stakeholders (with some limitations).27 
Today, changes in law are the dominant solutions to the privacy “problem,”
incrementally favoring either the consumer or business, but not both. In 
the context of rapidly changing technology, law’s inflexibility has the side 
effect of eliminating opportunity before it can ever have a chance of devel­
oping. Mechanisms and tools outside of law give policymakers options that 
are less politically polarizing and more flexible to adapt to changing views 
of the privacy problem as it emerges, enabling innovation and economic 
growth. The lowest-cost RFID technology, such as that designed for trac­
ing things in the supply chain, much less the technology that tracks people 
through identification and authorization cards, are both still too expensive 
for ubiquitous deployment needed to create an “Orwellian” surveillance 
society. Ronzani argues that markets, norms, and the architecture itself 
will flexibly and affordably evolve to address privacy concerns while giving 
the innovators a chance to use the technology to its highest social value.28 
VII. Missing from the Literature: Economics of 
Government’s Impact on Contactless Data 
Exchange Technology and Privacy 
As Brito points out: “We should be more concerned by government use of 
RFID— something to which privacy advocates have paid little attention.”29 
Although privacy advocates may have paid little attention to government 
use, some conclusions nevertheless can be drawn from available information. 
Governmental executive branches have many of the same functions and 
incentives as the private industry. The same benefits that contactless data 
exchange technology brings to the private sector also can improve operations 
27. Id. at 223. 
28. Id. at 222–223 and 230–231. 
29. See Brito, supra note 7 at 5. 
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494 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
of the public sector,30 and in many cases, governmental organizations inno­
vate and lead the private sector in adopting new technology. RFID began as 
a government initiative. Both Axis and Allied forces are widely credited as 
being the first to use RFID technology in an application to identify allied 
aircraft during World War II.31 Today the U.S. government embeds RFID 
chips into passports as well as RFID chips in its supply chains.32 Govern­
ment has been and will continue to be a heavy user of this technology, just 
like the private sector. The incentives and economics of that use should be 
similar, too. 
Being such large users and—in many cases—early adopters, governments 
often develop or sponsor the initial technology and knowledge base. As 
very large users of the technology for public purposes, governments develop 
polices and standards for its use. For example, the U.S. government through 
its National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published 
NIST SP-800–98 “Guidelines for Securing Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) Systems,” and this standard is available for public and private sec­
tor use.33 Government, in functioning like an enterprise and research arm, 
can help develop for itself the best practices in the use of the technology 
that the rest of the world can reuse. 
Just as its incentives for developing and using the technology are simi­
lar to those motivating private sector actors, the government’s incentives 
to collect, aggregate, repurpose, and reuse information are similar to the 
private sector’s as well. When government does not internalize all costs, 
including the social costs of privacy-eroding use, then the government’s 
use is economically inefficient, reducing overall welfare, in the same man­
ner as private sector overuse. The government, however, has powers and 
privileges beyond those of the private sector, and when government stands 
30.	 For additional discussion of this phenomenon, see Roland Trope’s essay “Maddening to 
Militaries and Museums” in Chapter 17 of this book, infra.
31.	 RFID JOURNAL, The History of RFID Technology 1, available at http://www.rfidjournal.com/ 
article/articleview/1338/1/129/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
32.	 For more discussion of this application, see chapters by Stephen Middlebrook and Roland 
Trope, infra. 
33.	  National Institute of Standards Technology, GUIDELINES FOR SECURING RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION (RFID) SYSTEMS (2007), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nist­
pubs/800-98/SP800-98_RFID-2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
BL_CSTF_RFID_FINAL.indd   495 7/8/13   3:43 PM
           
 
             
  
        
          
 
           
  
         
     
            
        
 
        
 
       
          
       
Privacy Implications of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 495 
sufficiently to benefit, history has shown it will use its powers and privileges. 
The consequences of using those powers and privileges sometimes distort 
incentives even further than the private sector can do on its own. Given how 
little research has been conducted in the analysis of government use of con-
tactless data exchange and RFID, this is an area ready for more research. 
VIII. Conclusion and Next Steps 
Like any change in law and regulation, RFID law and regulation will transfer 
wealth, creating winners and losers. Although little in the literature quanti­
fies the wealth at risk, policymakers, using economic theory, can anticipate 
and predict general flows of wealth implied by proposals in the RFID law 
literature, based on its assumptions about markets and the kind of risk 
analysis and assessment made. 
This survey of private-sector use of RFID and its resulting risks to pri­
vacy expectations reveals that part of the literature foresees well-functioning 
markets moderating private-sector privacy abuses, estimates privacy loss 
based on a likely or probable loss scenario, and recommends a reactive legal 
intervention policy to address actual discovered problems. Another part 
of the literature foresees market failure, estimates speculative, worst-case 
scenario privacy losses, and recommends a preemptive legal intervention 
policy to prevent possible dire outcomes. 







Market assumptions and the approach to risk management will determine 
policy outcomes. Policymakers should consciously evaluate their economic 
belief about the market and their approach toward risk management before 
taking a position on RFID technology policy. Both under-regulating and 
over-regulating have net social deadweight economic losses, including 
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496 RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments 
losses from economic opportunities preemptively and prematurely made 
illegal. Economic analysis shows that use and reuse of information gener­
ally improves total welfare, but external costs to the data subject can change 
that general conclusion. 
Policymakers concerned about privacy erosion arising from the private 
sector use and overuse of new technology, including RFID, need a compre­
hensive framework for analyzing this class of problem and the implications 
of proposed solutions. This literature survey demonstrates that analyzing 
market assumptions and approaches to risk management are necessary, but 
they are hardly sufficient. The social costs and benefits of government’s use 
of the technology is an opportunity for more research, and economic con­
siderations that apply to policy generally but not specifically to contactless 
data exchange have not been addressed here. 
The next step in this analysis would be to derive a framework that includes 
all other necessary and sufficient dimensions. Although such an undertaking 
is ambitious, it could be accomplished through a collaborative, multidisci­
plinary approach that includes legal, technical, and economic contributors. 
Such a framework would look at the constraints and incentives imposed by 
all modalities regulating actors’ behavior, their immediate and foreseeable 
future consequences on wealth generation and distribution, and their exter­
nal social side effects. The social impact of government’s use of both public 
sector and private sector collected information could be analyzed, includ­
ing the likelihood of policy effectiveness and lost opportunities of diverting 
regulatory resources to this technology to other uses of those resources. 
Whether regulating RFID use at all improves social welfare remains an 
open question. 
